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Abstract
In this paper we discuss approaches to eval-
uating and validating the ethical claims of a
Conversational AI system. We outline consid-
erations around both a top-down regulatory ap-
proach and bottom-up processes. We describe
the ethical basis for each approach and propose
a hybrid which we demonstrate by taking the
case of a customer service chatbot as an exam-
ple. We speculate on the kinds of top-down
and bottom-up processes that would need to
exist for a hybrid framework to successfully
function as both an enabler as well as a shep-
herd among multiple use-cases and multiple
competing AI solutions.
1 Introduction
If someone claimed their AI system was ethical, in
the sense that it operated according to some ethical
principles, would you believe them? How should
companies, individuals, and society communicate
and continually validate claims about so-called eth-
ical AI?
There are many unanswered questions around
how to design artificial moral agents if such a thing
is even possible. The challenges and limitations of
both top-down rule-based approaches and bottom-
up iterative learning processes have been examined
in the literature. In this paper we build on this work
and discuss such approaches as they may apply
specifically to Conversational AI, contextualised in
the increased pervasiveness of this technology and
in light of new regulations such as GDPR.
In most real-world deployments, explanations of
each decision made by an AI system would be be-
yond the validating capacity of individuals. What is
needed is the AI-behavioural equivalent of a hard-
ware standard. That is, every company must en-
sure that any AI deployed by them should meet a
minimum standard of behaviour. How do we de-
sign such a standard? The standard clearly needs
to be implementation-agnostic. This paper specu-
lates on whether top-down regulations, bottom-up
processes or a combination of the two would best
implement such a standard.
2 Motivation
There are several reasons why the ethics of Conver-
sational AI is worth attention, not least of which is
the increasing ubiquity of these agents in the last
few years in particular. Since 2016 was named the
“Year of the Bot” by Microsoft CEO, Satya Nadella
(Reynolds, 2017), chatbots and other Conversa-
tional Agents have been increasingly deployed in
various domains including healthcare, education,
customer service, personal organization, and so-
cial outreach. Recent work by Ruane et al. (2019)
highlights ethical considerations around the social
impact of Conversational Agents, and calls for a so-
cially mindful approach to building Conversational
Agents throughout the entire design and develop-
ment process. The authors argue that as the social
capital of Conversational Agents increases, so too
does the responsibility on agent owners to more
carefully consider how they design their agents,
and the impact it can have on individuals, especially
marginalized groups and society’s most vulnerable.
Conversational Agents seek to mimic a very hu-
man behaviour - communication through nuanced
language. As such, when we discuss ethical stan-
dards of behaviour for these agents it makes sense
to look towards the study of normative ethics, i.e.,
how one should act. The major schools of norma-
tive ethics that have emerged from moral philos-
ophy aim to define good and evil according to a
specific paradigm. Within each school there are
a number of moral theories that we can use to de-
fine actions as either right or wrong according to
the theory’s principles in context of the school of
thought. But how can we apply these concepts to
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Conversational Agents?
Conversational Agents as moral agents have re-
ceived less attention in the literature compared to
general AI-systems. At what point does the Con-
versational Agent become a moral agent? An agent
that cannot reason but simply carries out dialogue
as designed by the agent owner cannot be said to
be “responsible for its “actions, but the designer is
responsible. When a Conversational Agent can
learn beyond the scope of explicit dialogue de-
fined by a human, does it become a moral agent?
There is overlap here between responsibility and
morality. Ultimately, humans who build Conver-
sational Agents are responsible for their social im-
pact, whether they can predict and control how the
system works or not. However, unlike how the
concept of a company as an artificial person has
legal status, AI systems including Conversational
Agents lack clear legal status and definitions of re-
sponsibility for agent owners. As such, when we
discuss morality of these agents through actions
they should and should be designed not to take, we
do so without legal structure. Many philosophical
and moral theories and positions are based on a
spiritual world view. Humans are presumed to live
for themselves, and have innate value and rights by
virtue of their consciousness. Unlike humans, AI
systems are usually built for specific goals which
they aim to achieve on behalf of someone or some
organisation. As such, when we discuss machine
ethics, we cannot separate the machine from the
goals of the owner. We may need a new view of
ethics that does not place the motivation or onus on
the inherent “moral sense” of the agent.
3 Background
Just as there are two sides to the conversation, there
are also two sides to the development of conversa-
tional AI; natural language understanding (NLU)
and natural language generation (NLG), see Fig-
ure 1 for detailed example architecture. NLU is
required to interpret the users utterances and deter-
mine their meaning and intent. NLG is required
to generate the agents responses and may be based
on some specific response strategy. Models de-
veloped to understand user input usually employ
supervised or semi-supervised learning strategies
that leverage labelled datasets of conversational ut-
terances. These may be from conversation logs,
or other domain-specific sources. Once the user
intent is identified and some meaning has been de-
rived from the utterance, the agent needs to craft
a response. Many chatbots use a rule-based ap-
proach for this which amounts to a number of if-
else statements: if the user intent is X, respond with
Y. Depending on how much effort is dedicated to
crafting responses, there may be multiple available
responses out of which a random selection or some
criteria-based selection occurs. It is clear to see
how the dialogue designers own values could be
encoded into the design of the agent in this case.
The advantages of this method are control over the
quality of agent responses for all defined intents.
Of course, this approach becomes less viable as
the scope of the conversation increases, and can
lead to an inflexible and repetitive conversational
experience for users. Despite that, it is a common
approach, particularly where large training data sets
or computational resources are unavailable. Auto-
matic response generation may be implemented
using supervised or unsupervised techniques. With-
out significant amounts of training data and much,
often manual, evaluation, this approach will pro-
duce poor quality dialogue and may risk harming
user experience. In this case, the “values that are
baked into the system will reflect any bias in the
training dataset. Designing agent dialogue is one
aspect of the process. Other considerations during
development include how to ask the user for in-
formed consent in relation to data collection, how
to record and store conversation logs including per-
sonally identifiable information, how to design and
represent agent persona, and how to evaluate user
experience and protect users from harmful replies.
4 Ethics of Conversational AI
More advanced Conversational Agents such as the
personal assistant offering from major tech compa-
nies like Apple’s Siri, Google Assistant, Amazon
Alexa, and Microsoft’s Cortana allow the user to
interact conversationally while completing a range
of tasks such as using a search engine, screening
phone calls, playing media, getting restaurant rec-
ommendations, getting weather and news reports,
booking appointments, and setting reminders. The
list of supported tasks is long and when a user
engages in these tasks they quickly generate a de-
scriptive user profile. Not only is the agent able
to gather personally identifiable information (PII)
but also additional data such as users’ likes and
dislikes, their daily routine, social connections, and
future plans. Users are encouraged to self-disclose
to improve their experience through customization.
Users stand to gain in the short-term, when they dis-
close information (Saffarizadeh et al., 2017). Addi-
tionally, users often perceive their interaction to be
“anonymous”, or at least isolated to their own de-
vice, and this perceived anonymity can encourage
self-disclosure (Evans and Kortum, 2010). Recent
work by Xiao et al. (2019) found when a survey
was conducted via a Conversational Agent, users
were more engaged and provided more informa-
tive answers compared to a traditional survey form
(n=600). This highlights the impact of conversation
on user engagement and thus self-disclosure.
As it should, discussions of self-disclosure cen-
tre around user privacy, an important and increas-
ingly examined topic in literature. However, there
is another dimension to consider: user manipula-
tion. When an agent is customer-facing and rep-
resenting an organisation, a clear question arises:
whose interest should it serve? This is an ethi-
cal consideration as old as commerce itself; does
one put the customers’ needs over the company’s
bottom line? This is a well-known tension. In the
case of a human sales representative, especially one
who works on commission, there is often an expec-
tation that they may try to up-sell the customer.
The company expects them to meet user needs and
thus make sales, but the customer knows that the
salesperson likely puts their own, and possibly the
company’s, interests first. They are expecting to be
sold to. However, when a user is dealing with an
automatic agent such as a product recommendation
chatbot, they may not have the same intuition. The
user may expect information about the products
and assume it to be largely unbiased. The key dif-
ference here is awareness on the customer’s part
of how the agent was designed. From a business
perspective, the design approach will likely depend
on the nature of the sale. But should this behaviour
be governed by ethical principles, or the company’s
profit margins?
We already know companies try to employ dy-
namic pricing to maximise profits. Other tech-
niques designed to encourage purchases include
pressure tactics such as those employed on Book-
ing.com (and other sites) that show notifications
such as “x number of people are looking at this
right now” to try and manipulate the user into pur-
chasing quickly. However, users discovered that
these numbers were generated by a JavaScript call
to Math.random()! Refreshing the page would
generate a new number of people supposedly view-
ing the property. Such tactics, including but not
limited to, dynamic pricing could be even more
effective and less transparent in the context of Con-
versational AI because the user can be manipulated
using the large amount of personal information they
have already disclosed. Based on the social impact
of these agents and the potential to harm users,
there is a strong case to investigate how ethical
concerns should be addressed and, subsequently,
how claims of ethical standards or moral behaviour
should be validated.
5 Related Work
5.1 Ethics in AI
Most current research on ethics in AI seems to fo-
cus on two key strands: Explainable AI and Bias
in AI. Explainable AI is concerned with shedding
light on how an AI system arrives at a particular
decision. This is based on the idea that if we can
understand the reasoning process, we can evaluate
whether it was ethical or not. On the surface this
appears to be based in virtue ethics, where we fo-
cus on the agent’s “intent”, i.e. what features did
the system use to make this decision? For some
systems this approach makes sense; we cannot take
a consequentialist approach because we may not be
able to evaluate the impact of an agent’s decisions
due to limitations in computational resources or
access to necessary information. Given the lack
of consensus in philosophy about the ‘correct’‘ set
of ethics (for a human or even a machine), it is
difficult to recommend a deontological approach.
Much attention is therefore given to the problem
of bias in training data and how this can affect
the predictions or classifications made by a system.
However, for most commercial implementations,
training datasets hold significant value and are pro-
tected as trade secrets. Additionally, data protec-
tion laws such as GDPR that protect consumers
may mean this data cannot be easily shared for
third-party validation/verification.
5.2 Machine Ethics
In the introduction to the special issue of Ethics and
Information Technology, Dignum (2018) presents
a number of open questions around the moral, so-
cial, and legal consequences of decisions made
by AI systems. Dignum calls for frameworks to
guide design choices, and for theories and meth-
ods to evaluate decisions at all stages of develop-
ment. An important argument highlighted here is
the need to make explicit, the implicit values held
by various stakeholders that are further dependent
on their socio-cultural context. Dignum argues an
autonomous AI systems should be a responsible in
so far as it should take into account societal values,
moral and ethical considerations, and weigh the
priorities of different stakeholders.
Rahwan (2018) proposes a society-in-the-loop
approach which takes human-in-the-loop ideas
from Machine Learning for expert, uncontested
tasks and combines it with social contract theory
in order to embed societal values into algorithmic
governance for tasks or decisions where stakehold-
ers may have conflicting interests and values. The
current AI landscape could be considered to be in
a semi-State of Nature, the starting point for so-
cial contract theory as described by Hobbes (1967).
Currently AI systems are free to act as designed
because we lack the appropriate ethical principles
to apply to them or ways of reliably evaluating their
behaviour. However, we also do not currently have
technology that is capable of autonomously decid-
ing to: kill humans, disobey orders, manipulate
its own code, or refuse to be shut down. In social
contract theory, morality is derived from a set of
rules that rational individuals agree to obey for the
mutual benefit of social order. This is what Rah-
wan (2018) argues for while acknowledging that a
key limitation of this approach is the difficulty in
articulating social values and the limits of public
engagement on nuanced issues. In a similar vein,
Rawls (1971) presented a thought experiment to
identify moral acts as those everyone would agree
to if they were unbiased. He describes a thought
experiment in which individuals striving to cooper-
ate act behind a “veil of ignorance”, blind to their
gender, race, age, intelligence, wealth, skills, edu-
cation, and religion. Principles of justice formed
in this unbiased way could be considered to be
fair. This may be an approach that could be used
to develop an idea of fairness in Conversational
AI where stakeholders have conflicting interests.
If the veil of ignorance masked whether the par-
ticipant was an agent owner, user, or some other
stakeholder, would they consider a design decision
to be fair? This is an example of a top-down ap-
proach where morality is defined or described, and
the agent is developed accordingly.
Arnold and Scheutz (2018) discuss the limita-
tions of a “big red button” approach - i.e. when
a system starts making decisions outside accept-
able bounds, a stop-measure could be used to shut
it down. The authors argue this option would al-
ready be too late because some as-yet undefined
harm would have to occur to warrant shutdown.
The authors also detail concerns such as if the sys-
tem somehow got control of and disabled its own
shutdown button e.g. maximising its reward func-
tion by disabling system shutdown, or if a human
couldn’t press the button in time to avoid further
harm. Instead, the authors argue for an ethical core
(EC) component that generates scenarios and eval-
uates the system’s decisions in an on-going manner.
They argue this is in line with required standards of
safety; we don’t want to simply avoid disaster, we
want reliable and consistent safe, legal, and moral
behaviour. This work is an example of algorithms
governing algorithms but it is not clear how the eth-
ical core would establish whether the system was
operating outside of ethically acceptable behaviour
because much of the focus of the paper is on en-
suring that the system cannot determine it is being
tested and then manipulate the test by altering its
behaviour.
5.3 Artificial Morality
Possibly the most closely related work and on
which this paper builds is that of Allen et al. (2005)
who discuss how artificial morality can be imple-
mented, that is, designing agents that have a sense
of ethics and moral reasoning. The authors high-
light that AI systems take part in activities that
have moral consequences and thus their actions
should be evaluated. If this evaluation is not pos-
sible for humans to do due to complexity or speed
of computation, then it follows that systems should
have some ethical and legal understanding “built in”
such that they can be monitored by themselves or
by another automatic process. Some systems can
be treated as ethical black boxes, and the output
evaluated, however in other scenarios the authors
argue ethical reasoning should be considered an
engineering design challenge that tackles difficult
questions such as how to make explicit ethical deci-
sions. This work was published in 2005 and we’ve
now seen where such challenges have come to light
in the context of autonomous vehicles who must
have decision-making abilities embedded into their
algorithms that are deeply ethical in nature such as
who should the car prioritise in a safety-critical sce-
nario, a passenger or a pedestrian? Allen et al. look
at top-down approaches that aim to turn explicit the-
ories of moral behaviour into algorithms that can
be used to develop artificial moral agents (AMAs).
Top-down approaches suffer from a limitation of
any rule-based approach to intelligent behaviour;
they don’t generalise well to real world complex
scenarios. Such a deontological approach requires
a set of ethical or moral rules to implement. The au-
thors highlight some well-known sources including
religious rules such as the Ten Commandments but
note that selecting guidelines from any such source
would naturally be controversial. The authors note
a strength of this approach is the ability to add rules
for specific situations. This is particularly effec-
tive where the system’s scope is both limited and
well defined. However, a major limitation is the
conflict rules can cause when they require differ-
ent actions in the same scenario and these conflicts
cannot be computationally resolved. The authors
look towards moral philosophy for guidance includ-
ing consequentialist and deontology ethics. The
authors note utilitarianism’s Achilles heel is the
measurement problem, and would also require sig-
nificant computation to evaluate the consequences
of alternative actions even if some measurement
criteria could be agreed upon. The authors turn to
Kant’s categorical imperative as a higher principle
that would not require evaluating specific actions
that may conflict. The authors discuss the com-
putational burden on such a system and the level
of understanding of human psychology and how
actions could affect all humans. Although these
approaches are limited by computational capacity
and availability of information, human beings are
capable of acting morally within similar constraints.
A key difference is the idea of phronesis, or lived
experience. The work also looks at bottom-up ap-
proaches in an attempt to train an agent to mimic
moral human behaviour (phronesis). Bottom-up
approaches do not require a set of rules that should
be followed but instead try to provide scenarios in
which the “right” or moral action is rewarded. This
may be implemented using reinforcement learning.
This approach is akin to how humans learn to be-
have morally, through interaction. While top-down
approaches are difficult to conceptualize and make
explicit, bottom-up processes are difficult to imple-
ment. The authors raise concerns that have been
echoed in later works such as Arnold and Scheutz
(2018) discussion of an “Ethical Core”, around
how a system that has the capacity to learn ethical
behaviour can also learn unethical behaviour.
The authors suggest some kind of blind test that
would compare a system’s performance to that of
a human on a set of moral judgements tests like a
Moral Turing Test (Allen et al., 2000). Of course,
this test would suffer from the same limitations of
the Turing Test in trying to evaluate intelligence.
6 Top-down Regulation
There are many vision papers about top-down regu-
lation and what it would look like. Previous discus-
sion around user manipulation in Section 1 high-
lights how specific legal requirements need to be
met in order to ensure ethical design. GDPR is
an example of legislation that explicitly addresses
data privacy and consent issues and requires trans-
parency in relation to these concerns. However, it
is not AI-specific and while it addresses AI-related
concerns such as decisions about individuals as a
result of automated decision making and profiling1,
these requirements apply to a narrow set of deci-
sions, and the subsequent requirements leave some
room for debate.
This ambiguity can be associated with the gen-
eral difficulty in creating guidelines for AI. Jobin
et al. (2019) showed companies, research institu-
tions, and public sector organizations around the
world have all issued guidelines for ethical artificial
intelligence and there appears to be global conver-
gence around five ethical principles: transparency,
justice and fairness, non-maleficence, responsibil-
ity, and privacy. However, the authors discovered
substantive divergence in how these are interpreted,
determined significant, in which scenarios they ap-
ply, and the recommended implementation strate-
gies, noting that there was no single principle that
appeared in all of the 84 guidelines they reviewed!
From an interaction perspective, this ambigu-
ity allows companies to use specific language to
remove agency from the user. We can see how
GDPR guidelines around consent and cookies has
been implemented across various websites which
use legal jargon to obfuscate cookie preferences
such that the user will simply accept recommended
cookies (including advertising). Similarly, a chat-
bot that uses ambiguous language when asking for
user consent to process their data is taking advan-
tage of limitations of the user’s understanding of
1EU GDPR Article 22: https://www.privacy-
regulation.eu/en/article-22-automated-individual-decision-
making-including-profiling-GDPR.htm
the system and what can be done with their data.
While GDPR is a good starting point, AI systems
and even Conversational AI need their own specific
regulations and even still, these are unlikely to be
able to guarantee ethical implementation on their
own. Another challenge for a top-down regulation
approach is that it is, by nature, a slow process and
it cannot seem to keep pace with technological de-
velopment because the pace of innovation is much
faster than the deliberation of complex social and
ethical questions, and the drafting of legislation or
guidelines to address them.
How could we validate that an AI system is ad-
hering to set out regulations? One option is a sim-
ulation engine, much like the “ethical core” pro-
posed by Arnold and Scheutz (2018), whereby the
system is continually tested in simulated scenarios
that require it to make decisions, where multiple
good, bad, and ambiguous choices are available
to it.Although it remains to be seen how computa-
tionally expensive this option would be. A system
could be said to meet expectations if it reliably
makes good choices in these situations. A chal-
lenge with this approach is the difficulty of explic-
itly coding these ethical principles into the system
and designing scenarios to test them. This process
should be led by the guidelines and regulations
that are being evaluated and highlights the need for
explicit and AI-specific regulations.
The experience of GDPR and how agent owner
values impact design of an agent shows us that the
best any top-down regulation can achieve is to em-
phasize the achievement of some abstract value.
Hutchinson and Mitchell (2019) illustrates quite
clearly, how these abstract values are themselves
contentious and consequently the yardsticks and
metrics used to measure the achievement of said
value may be of little use. This leaves us with the
notion of designing-in or modifying the bottom-up
processes that a company uses to create Conversa-
tional Agents, to achieve our desired goal. This
has been done previously in the area of software
testing. The effectiveness of automated unit-tests,
integration tests and continuous build processes has
led to large software projects being successfully de-
veloped and deployed.
7 Bottom-up Processes
By a bottom-up process, we mean the introduction
of either an activity, artefact, or a combination of
the two, such that a particular team-defined unit
Figure 1: Chatbot Architecture from V-Soft Consult-
ing2
of code progresses to the next stage of the team’s
development/build/deployment cycle. The bottom-
up process may certify that the unit of code, either
sufficiently meets pre-defined criteria or possesses
pre-defined attributes according to team policy. The
process need not be a boolean-style (“test pass / test
fail”) gatekeeper, but rather it could result in any
measure that can be compared with another unit of
code’s performance on that process.
Bias Removal Checklist As mentioned previ-
ously, opening up datasets to public scrutiny might
be difficult due to privacy concerns and release of
technological secrets. However, regardless of the
datasets being used, it is possible to have open-
to-scrutiny bias removal checklists, which contain
statistical tests to be run and requirements for mea-
sures to be publicly recorded. For any AI library
that is used by a company, the library must be cer-
tified to have cleared the bias removal checklist.
Open-Source Certified Components Take the
scenario of a customer service Conversational
Agent which requires personally identifiable infor-
mation (PII) to validate the user and subsequently
address their query. Customer interactions need to
be logged for a number of legal and operational rea-
sons, but PII should not be stored in plain text logs
that have team-wide or department-wide access. A
possible solution is partially encrypted logs or dis-
tributed logs. This requires reliably identifying PII
which may not be difficult when this information
is provided by the user in response to a question
like “What is your account number?” but becomes
more difficult when the user inadvertently or other-
wise self-discloses sensitive information. How can
we validate that the logs are encrypted? An open
source/certified persistence layer that encrypts PII
can be devised. Repeatable builds (Heydon et al.,
2001) are a software engineering feature that every
professional software organization strives to cre-
ate through its build process. Up until now, these
repeatable builds were useful for the software de-
veloper and maintainer, to find and reproduce bugs.
However, now these can be used by a conformance
tester to evaluate whether the deployed software
used a particular unbiased dataset or behaviour-
selection procedures or not. Using mechanisms
such as build verifiability, we can approach the
equivalence of certification. That is, for any given
build of a software, there must be a repeatable build
process that always uses the open-source/certified
persistence layer and automated test cases check
whether this has been done. The automated test
cases’ status would act as a certifying label for the
deployed conversational agent. A chatbot could dis-
close its certification status to the user to build trust.
We already accept such tests from certification au-
thorities in the field of electronics manufacture,
medical devices, etc.
This would seem to suggest that the presence of
bottom-up processes would be sufficient to ensure
that only trustable code is being deployed. How-
ever, the intent of the bias removal checklist, as
well as automated certification of continuously de-
ployed software all depend on ’governance creden-
tials’ of the checklist creator as well as the certifica-
tion test creators. These credentials could develop
in a self-organizing manner by a voluntary body.
However, a more efficient process that society has
settled on for other domains, such as pharmaceuti-
cals, is the presence of a neutral third-party, estab-
lished by regulation.
8 Hybrid Process
We discussed in Section 6 how regulations that are
open to interpretation make it easy to circumvent
a top-down process. The lack of a bottom-up pro-
cess that can also guarantee ethical behaviour is a
disappointment. That is why we argue for a com-
bination of both. Regulation largely focuses on
what an agent should NOT do whereas a certificate
can focus on what an agent will do in an ethical
sense. It is unlikely that regulation will cover every
case, and context, where conversational AI could
be gainfully employed. This would mean that reg-
ulation would have to leave space for bottom-up,
decentralized processes to flexibly adapt to various
situations. However, the impact of a rogue com-
pany or developer given free rein to make their own
judgements could be quite harmful to vulnerable
groups in society. This implies that, in reality, there
would need to be an inter-dependent framework
of top-down regulation as well as bottom-up pro-
cesses, to ensure that conversational AI is only used
in an ethical manner. We can see how this is mir-
rored in both safety legislation and certifications.
It is already accepted practice that if a product is
defective it is recalled, destroyed, and possibly the
company responsible is fined. The company then
has to fix its bottom-up processes to avoid the same
malfunction in the future.
Figure 2: Aggressive Selling Techniques
While general ethical concerns such as trans-
parency, privacy, trust, and social responsibility
around Conversational Agents are true for most
or all conversational systems, the specific ethical
issues and considerations that arise vary markedly
depending on the design of the agent, its use case,
and the profile of the user group (Ruane et al.,
2019). Thus, a top-down regulation for conver-
sational agents might specify that a chatbot must
in no case bully a user into making a decision (see
Figure 2 for an example where the user does not
have a way to validate the agent’s stock claims).
The bottom-up process might include a checklist
that specifies the maximum number of times a cus-
tomer’s negative intent-to-buy is countered with
an offer. In another example, a top-down regula-
tion might specify that in no case should PII that
is revealed during a conversation be stored. The
bottom-up process to meet this regulation could be
build-verifiability of using a particular version of
a certified component, along with test cases that
attempt to search for any PII in stored conversation
logs.
9 Conclusion
It is clear that while there are many questions to be
addressed around ethical conversational AI, a hy-
brid approach that leverages both top-down regula-
tion to govern what a Conversational Agent should
not do, and bottom-up processes that validate what
it will do is preferable to relying on either approach
in isolation. It is not the contention of this paper,
that one particular top-down regulation or one par-
ticular bottom-up process is the magic sauce that
makes a chatbot ethical. Rather that we will need
a set of inter-dependent processes that will incen-
tivize small, but verifiable claims about conversa-
tional agent behaviour and agent-owner ethics.
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